January 1945 and the "Formosa Instrument Flight School"

January arrived, bringing miserable weather and heavily overcast skies. As Task Force 38 headed for Formosa and points west, we were briefed about the operation, and advised to prepare for long, hard days.

 

Little did we realize how hard the operation would be. During the month we lost, not only a number of good pilots, but also the Air Group Commander John Voorhis, and the Squadron Commander Frank K. Upham.

 

According to Frank's wingman who followed him down as his plane lost power. Frank made a good "dead stick" water landing and stepped out on the wing, turned to retrieve his rubber raft from the cockpit, when an explosion completely obliterated the plane. It appeared as if Frank had a fire in the wing, which may have ignited his fuel tank, or his bomb and rockets.

 

In order to clarify the above reference to bombs and rockets it would be best to review the required armament of an F6F Fighter. The F6F was armed with six .50 caliber machine guns, each carrying 400 rounds, for a total of 2400. Ammunition belts were loaded in the following type sequence: 1-armor piercing, l-incendiary, 1-tracer. The tracers helped the pilot maintain the proper lead on the target when firing. In the combat zone, each fighter carried a 500 pound bomb mounted on a pylon beneath one of the wings. It also carried six 5-inch HVAR rockets equipped with armor piercing heads, mounted on pylons beneath the wings.

 

On this operation pilots would be complying with two new modes of operation. Each would fly two missions per day. If a pilot flew a strike or sweep over enemy territory in the morning, he would fly a CAP (Combat Air Patrol) over the Fleet or over a Picket Destroyer in the afternoon. Conversely, if he flew a CAP in the morning, he would fly a strike or sweep in the afternoon.

 

Pilots not flying on a particular day would be placed in Condition 1 or Condition 3. Condition 1 required pilots to sit in their planes on the deck, ready to start engines and make an emergency takeoff, in the event of approaching enemy planes. In order to have warm engines, and check any malfunctions that might occur, the pilots would start and run engines every 20 minutes. Condition 3 was a little more relaxed. The pilots would sit in the ready room in full flight gear. They had to be ready to go to the flight deck and man planes, if the pilots in Condition 1 were launched.

 

The ever growing menace of Kamikaze pilots had increased the amount of protection required by the Fleet, mandating several types of CAP. Usually one CAP would operate at about 20,000 to 25,000 feet above the Fleet. Another would operate at 12,000 to 15,000 feet. At various stations around the Fleet planes, flew a JACK patrols. This was usually conducted at about 2,000 to 5,000 feet. The people flying the JACK patrols would execute a continuous figure eight path in their sector.

 

The Kamikaze pilots had three methods of approach to the Fleet. Some would fly over at high altitude and drop aluminum foil (Window) in an attempt to distract the high CAP. Others would approach in a shallow dive until over the Fleet, then dive upon a the ships. These usually were destroyed by the ship's guns or the CAP. The third approach would involve a dive from great height to a point just above the water surface, several miles from the Fleet. These planes would have tremendous speed and would stay a few feet above the water until reaching the Fleet. They would then pull up over the screen of Destroyers and head for a carrier or battle ship. This type was the most difficult to destroy, because of the speed of approach, and because they were below the limit of Radar detection.

 

A Picket Destroyer would be deployed about 50 to 60 miles from the Fleet. As the planes returned from a strike or sweep, they would circle the Picket Destroyer before heading toward the Fleet. A CAP was always on station above the Picket Destroyer. This was necessary because Jap Kamikaze pilots would follow our planes as they returned from enemy territory. These pilots would be low enough and far enough behind our returning planes, that they were hard to detect. The CAP over the Picket Destroyer would usually catch these intruders and destroy them before they could locate the Fleet.

 

The Fleet usually remained far enough offshore to be out of range of enemy land based planes. Whenever implementing an operation to attack enemy installations, the Fleet would commence a high speed run in (30 Knots) the afternoon before the attack. This would put the carriers within striking range of the targets by launch time the next morning.

 

Late in the afternoon of the 2nd of January the Task Group began its high speed run in. The skies were overcast, the wind picking up, and a storm was approaching. We were preparing to launch our night fighters, when an incident occurred that was so horrible and sad that it is still etched in my memory. I was standing on the deck beside the island and aft of the launching catapult. The pilot, in the gear, applied full throttle and gave the signal to activate the catapult. At this point all the catapult crew would normally be out of the plane's slipstream and safe. Somehow one of the crew was still behind the plane as it reached full power. The force of the plane's slipstream when combined with the 30 knot wind blowing across the deck unbalanced the crew member and he disappeared over the edge of the carrier into the sea. The waves at that point were so high that it was nearly impossible to distinguish the crewman. The carrier was unable to respond, so a destroyer was designated to attempt a rescue. The destroyer was unsuccessful. All that night, and for many days after, all I could think about was that poor man and what he must have felt as he saw the Fleet pull away, and realized he was to die in the sea alone.

 

The morning of 3 January dawned with a low overcast, a ceiling of 200 to 300 feet, drizzle and low scudding clouds. This type of weather was typical around Formosa in the winter. Since most of the flying we did in this area was on instruments, I like to refer to this period as my training in the Formosa Instrument Flight School-the best instrument training in the world.

 

Our assignment was a CAP over the Fleet. After takeoff we circled to join up. McBrayer's engine was malfunctioning so he had to land back aboard. Bajack's plane wouldn't start. This left Auerbach and myself to fly the CAP. After a few circles I contacted CIC and asked for instructions. I was told to climb through the overcast and execute the high CAP. I signaled Jack Auerbach to join up and we headed up through the overcast, which was about 9,000 feet thick. While on station we kept a sharp lookout for enemy planes, but none appeared. At the end of the period we let down through the overcast and landed.

 

After refueling, Mac, Sig, Jack, and I took off to fly a JACK patrol near the perimeter of the Fleet. As planes returned from strikes on Formosa, no Kamikazes were found tailing them. From the reports given by returning planes, Formosa was a bad place. The antiaircraft fire was heavy and accurate.

 

The weather on the morning of 4 January was every bit as bad as the day before. This time McBrayer's Division was among the group assigned to fly a strike on Formosa.

 

After a wet take off, and a sloppy join up, 5 divisions of fighters (20 planes) headed west toward Formosa at an altitude of about 150-250 feet. We continued on course until, out of the drizzle, the high, black, vertical cliffs of the eastern side of Formosa suddenly appeared presenting a barrier to our westward course. At this point the leader made a blunder that might well have killed us all.

 

In the Navy, flight patterns are predominantly to the port (left) Carrier break up and landing is accomplished by port turns. Formations customarily make turns to port. Pilots become accustomed to this type of operation and handle it with automatic reaction. The clown leading the flight that day made a starboard (right) turn into the flight who were all positioned to execute a port turn. At that moment all became confusion. Formations broke up and planes were heading in all directions. Fortunately no mid-air collisions occurred.

 

I remained glued to McBrayer's wing, and after a nightmare of swishing wings, fuselages and some near collisions, we got away from the mess. Mac decided to climb through the overcast. He gave me the signal and I moved in until my wing was only 5 to 10 feet from his horizontal stabilizer. As we climbed, I could scarcely see his tail even at that short distance. I had been running low on fuel, and was just about to change tanks when the melee began. Now, I did not dare switch tanks for fear that any interruption in my power would cause me to lose Mac. As I sat with my eyes riveted on Mac's tail, suffering intense vertigo, and waiting for my engine to conk out, we broke out above the cloud deck at about 12,000 feet. Maintaining a rate of climb of 1000 feet per minute, it had taken a little over 12 minutes to climb through the overcast. It certainly felt good to be out of the pea soup. As we circled waiting for more of the flight to come out on top, a couple of Zero Fighters broke out and we headed for them. Immediately they dove back into the cloud cover. Still none of our flight showed up. Once again two fighters appeared. Mac and I were waiting, and pounced on them. We each got off a decent burst. As they dove back into the clouds, we saw smoke trailing them. Finally several more of our flight appeared. We looked around for a hole that would permit us to get down and attack our assigned targets. Finally one appeared. Looking down we could see we were over an airfield. We immediately dove through the hole and began strafing and rocketing the buildings, and planes on the field. The anti-aircraft flak was heavy but none of us was hit. I managed some good rocket hits on a hangar. After the dive we soared back up through the hole in the overcast.

 

As our fuel was getting low, we joined up and headed for the carrier. We flew above the clouds monitoring the ZB -YE until the strength of the signal indicated we were nearing our Carrier. At that point we tightened up the formation and began our letdown. As we broke out of the clouds, the ceiling was about 350 feet. At that altitude, it was a good thing our letdown had brought us near the Carrier. Otherwise the ZB -YE might not have guided us in. As we circled the Carrier awaiting our turn in the landing pattern, new perils appeared. Other planes letting down through the overcast came whistling out of the clouds on all sides. After more close calls we finally landed.

 

Later we learned some of the pilots who did not climb through the overcast encountered shipping targets that they were able to strafe. Although our division didn't hit any shipping, we did chalk up some successes. The field we attacked turned out to be Shinchiku Airfield. From this point, conservation of fuel became a matter of primary concern. Greater distance to targets, and flights of long duration in search for the reported Japanese Task Force, required the utmost in fuel management, to assure a return to the carrier.